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Abstract—Evolutionary game theory is used to model the
evolution of competing strategies in a population of players.
Evolutionary stability of a strategy is a dynamic equilibrium,
in which any competing mutated strategy would be wiped
out from a population. If a strategy is weak evolutionarily
stable, the competing strategy may manage to survive within
the network. Understanding the network-related factors that
affect the evolutionary stability of a strategy would be critical in
making accurate predictions about the behaviour of a strategy in
a real-world strategic decision making environment. In this work,
we evaluate the effect of network topology on the evolutionary
stability of a strategy. We focus on two well-known strategies
known as the Zero-determinant strategy and the Pavlov strategy.
Zero-determinant strategies have been shown to be evolutionarily
unstable in a well-mixed population of players. We identify
that the Zero-determinant strategy may survive, and may even
dominate in a population of players connected through a non-
homogeneous network. We introduce the concept of ‘topological
stability’ to denote this phenomenon. We argue that not only the
network topology, but also the evolutionary process applied and
the initial distribution of strategies are critical in determining
the evolutionary stability of strategies. Further, we observe that
topological stability could affect other well-known strategies as
well, such as the general cooperator strategy and the cooperator
strategy. Our observations suggest that the variation of evolu-
tionary stability due to topological stability of strategies may be
more prevalent in the social context of strategic evolution, in
comparison to the biological context.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is the science of strategic decision making
among autonomous players [1]. Game theory has its roots in
micro-economics and has later been adopted in myriad fields
of study, such as biology, psychology and computer science
[2]. Evolutionary game theory is the branch of study that has
resulted from the adoption of game theory into evolutionary
biology [3]. It is used to study how a particular strategy or a
group of strategies would evolve over time in a population of
players. If a strategy is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS),
once it is adopted by a population of players, any mutated
strategy would not be able to invade it [4]. Evolutionary
stability of a strategy could further be divided into two sub
categories. strong ESS and weak ESS (also called asymptotic
stable strategy and stable strategy [5]). If a strategy is in a
weak evolutionarily stable state, the invading strategy does not
completely die-out but its population does not increase [5].
Meanwhile, complex networks science is increasingly used
to model and analyse human interactions [6], [7]. Many so-
cieties where humans or other sentient agents interact display
heterogeneous network topologies, in which some agents /
people are very well connected while others are sparsely con-
nected [7], [8]. In such societies or multi-agent networks [9],
the topology of the network of interactions can be quantified
by a range of metrics, including the clustering coefficient,
average path length, global and local assortativity [10], [11],
[12], topological mutual information [13], [14], various static
and dynamic centrality measures [15] and so forth. Moreover,
many of these social systems display the so-called scale-free
property, which is characterised by maximum heterogeneity in
terms of number of connections, and the small-world property,
where the characteristic path length is comparatively small
and the clustering comparatively high. Therefore it is clear
that the topology of any society or agent network must be
considered in determining the dynamics of a system, including
how individual agents make decisions in such systems.
In this work, we study how network topology affects the
evolutionary stability of strategies. We use a class of strategies
known as ‘memory-one strategies’ in prisoner’s dilemma (PD)
game to evaluate the effect of network topology on evolution-
ary stability. Iterated prisoner’s dilemma game has widely been
used to model -the strategic decision making of self-interested
opponents [16], [17], [18]. In memory-one strategies, each
player would base his action on a probability derived based on
the previous interaction with the same opponent [19], [20]. In
this work, we particularly focus on a sub-class of memory-
one strategies known as ‘Zero-Determinant(ZD) strategies’,
along with other well-known memory-one strategies. Zero-
determinant strategies have been demonstrated to be extortion-
ate strategies, meaning that they have the ability to unilaterally
set the payoff of the opponent [21]. Intuitively, this would
suggest that Zero-Determinant strategies have the potential
to be evolutionarily stable against any competing strategy.
However, Zero-determinant strategies have later been shown
to be evolutionarily unstable in a well-mixed population of
players [18]. In this work, we test whether network topology
affects the evolutionary stability of Zero-determinant strategies
in a non-homogeneous network of players.
To test the effect of network topology, we use two well
known network classes, known as the scale-free networks
[7] and well-mixed networks. Also, we use two evolutionary
processes to evolve the populations. First, we test the effect of
topology using the death-birth Moran process [22], which is
an evolutionary process used to model the evolution of players
over time, particularly in biological systems. Then we use
a stochastic strategy adoption process that would update the
strategy of a randomly selected node, by comparing it with
a selected neighbour’s strategy. The same process has been
used as an evolutionary process by Santos et al. [23], with
the pure-strategy PD game. We will refer to this evolutionary
process as the ‘strategy adoption process’ in the rest of the
paper. We compare and contrast the evolutionary outcomes
of these two processes when players are placed in both well-
mixed networks and scale-free networks. Based on the results
of these observations, we argue that the evolutionarily unstable
strategies in a well-mixed population may survive and even
dominate in a heterogeneous network of players. We show that
the topology of the interactions of the players, the evolutionary
update process as well as the initial topological distribution
of players are significant determining the overall evolutionary
stability of a strategy. When the players are distributed in a
homogeneous network however, the evolutionary process used
would not have a significant effect the evolutionary stability
of a strategy. We further test the effect of topology on the
evolutionary stability by varying network assortativity [10],
which is a measure of the similarity of mixing of nodes
in a network. We argue that when the network becomes
more heterogeneous, network topology would have a more
significant effect on the evolutionary stability of strategies.
We call this topologically influenced evolutionary stability of
strategies as ‘topological stability’.
Understanding the topological effect on the evolutionary
stability of a strategy would help us to make better predictions
about the evolutionary stability of a strategy in a real-world
environment. Even though a strategy may be theoretically
stable or not, its actual evolutionary behaviour may depend
on the topology of the interconnections in the population and
the evolutionary update mechanism used. By studying these
effects extensively, the modelling of evolutionary games may
be improved, by increasing the accuracy of the predictions of
the evolutionary stability of strategies.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We begin
by providing a background on the theoretical aspects of evo-
lutionary game theory and complex network science, within
the scope of this work. Therein we introduce the memory-one
strategies in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) game, as
well as a sub-class of memory-one strategies known as Zero-
determinant strategies. Further, we explain death-birth Moran
process and its significance in determining the evolutionary
stability of a strategy, comparing it with the strategy adoption
process suggested by Santos et al. [23]. Next, we present
the results obtained by simulating both the death-birth Moran
process and the strategy adoption process in well-mixed and
scale-free networks of players. Further, we present the results
on how the variation of network heterogeneity, measured using
the network assortativity, affects the evolutionary stability
of strategies. Finally, we discuss the results, presenting our
conclusions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Game Theory
Game theory is the study of strategic decision making
[1]. Game theory was first developed as a branch of micro-
economics [1], [2]. However, later it has been adopted in
diverse fields of study, such as evolutionary biology, sociology,
psychology, political science and computer science [2]. Game
theory has gained such wide applicability due to the prevalence
of strategic decision making across different fields of study.
One of the key concepts of Game theory is that of Nash
equilibrium [24]. Nash equilibrium suggests that there is an
equilibrium state in a strategic game, which neither player
would benefit deviating from. Nash equilibrium can be defined
for both pure strategy and mixed strategy scenarios. Also, a
strategy game could have multiple Nash equilibria.
A formal definition for Nash equilibrium can be given as
follows. Let (S, f) be a game with n players, where Si is the
strategy set of a given player i. Thus, the strategy profile S
consisting of the strategy sets of all players would be, S =
S1 × S2 × S3....× Sn. f = (f1(x), ....., fn(x)) would be the
payoff function for xǫS. Suppose xi is th strategy profile of
player i and x−i be the strategy profile of all players except
player i. Thus, when each player iǫ1, ....., n chooses strategy
xi that would result in the strategy profile x = (x1, ...., xn),
giving a payoff of f(i) to that particular player. A strategy
profile x∗ǫS is in Nash equilibrium if no unilateral deviation
in strategy by any single player would return a higher utility
for that particular player. Formally put,
∀i, xiǫSi : fi(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) ≥ fi(xi, x
∗
−i) (1)
B. Evolutionary Game Theory
Evolutionary game theory is an outcome of the adaptation
of game theory into the field of evolutionary biology [3], [4].
Evolutionary biology is based on the idea that an organism’s
genes largely contribute to its observable characteristics. Thus,
genes determine the fitness of an organism in a given envi-
ronment. Evolutionary game theory argues that the success of
an organism depends on its interaction with other organisms
within a population. Thus, the fitness of an organism would
be dependent on its interaction with other organisms in that
population. In game theoretic terminology, the interactions
of players would be the strategies and the fitness of each
strategy would be the payoff. As the population evolves
over time, certain strategies would be dominant while some
other strategies would be extinct. Thus, evolutionary game
theory provides a mathematical basis to model the evolutionary
process using concepts of game theory. On the other hand, it
opens a new dimension for game theorists to observe how the
evolution of strategies in games would happen over time in
populations of players. Some of the critical questions asked in
EGT include; which populations/strategies are stable? When
to individuals adopt other strategies? and would it be possible
for mutants to invade a given population?
The equivalent concept to Nash Equilibrium in evolutionary
game theory, is evolutionary stability [25]. If Nash Equilibrium
can be considered as a static equilibrium, evolutionary stability
represents a dynamic equilibrium of a strategy, over time. A
strategy is called evolutionarily stable if it has the potential
to dominate over any mutant strategy [3]. Evolutionary games
are often modelled as iterative games where a population of
players play the same game iteratively in a well-mixed or a
spatially distributed environment [26].
1) Iterated prisoner’s dilemma: Prisoner’s dilemma is a
game that is found in classical game theory [27]. Given the
payoff matrix in Fig. 1, the inequality T>R>P>S should be
satisfied in a prisoner’s dilemma game. In other words, in
the prisoner’s dilemma game, the highest mutual payoffs are
obtained by the players when both players cooperate. However,
if one player cooperates while the other defects, the defector
would obtain a higher payoff. The dilemma is that the Nash
Equilibrium of this game, which occurs when both players
defect, does not provide the optimum payoff for both the
players.
In iterated prisoner’s dilemma(IPD), the prisoner’s dilemma
game is iterated over many time-steps, over a population of
players [17]. Each player would play a single iteration of the
game with its neighbours in each time-step. Iterated prisoner’s
dilemma game is widely used to model the autonomous deci-
sion making behaviour of self-interested players. It has been
demonstrated that the topology of the network is significant in
the evolution of cooperation of strategies in the IPD game [23].
For example, when the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game is
played among pure cooperation and pure defection strategies,
cooperation evolves to be the dominant strategy in a population
of players that are distributed in a scale-free topology.
R, R S, T
T, S P, P
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate
Defect
Player 2
P
la
ye
r 
1
Fig. 1: The payoff matrix of the prisoner’s dilemma game.
T>R>P>S
2) Memory-one strategies: As opposed to pure strategies
of cooperation and defection, mixed strategies of prisoner’s
dilemma game are based on the assumption that each player
chooses a strategy based on a probability distribution. In fact,
pure strategies can be regarded as a special case of mixed
strategies where each strategy is chosen with the probability
of one. Memory-one strategies [18], [28] are a special sub-
class of mixed strategies, where the current mixed strategy of
a game would depend on the immediate previous interaction
between the two players in concern. On the other hand,
Memory-one strategies are a specialisation of a more general
class of strategies called finite-memory strategies [18], [28],
where the current mixed strategy would be dependent on n
number of historical states between the two players.
When considering the previous state between two players
in a PD game, there could be four possible states. Namely
CC, CD, DC and DD, where C represents cooperation and
D represents defection, respectively. Memory-one strategies
are represented by calculating the probabilities of cooperation
by a player in the next move, given the type of the previous
interaction of the player with the same opponent. For example,
a strategy (1,1,1,1) would imply that the Player A would
cooperate with player B, irrespective of the previous encounter
between Player A and B. Similarly, (0,0,0,0) would represent a
player that always defects. Thus, the pure strategy cooperation
and defection can be thought of as a special case of memory-
one or finite memory strategies. By varying the probabilities
of cooperation under each of the previous encounters, it is
possible to define any number of mixed strategies. Some of the
well-known memory-one strategies include the Pavlov strategy
(1,0,0,1) and the general cooperator (0.935, 0.229, 0.266, 0.42)
strategy. General cooperator is the evolutionarily dominating
strategy that evolved at low mutation rates as demonstrated
by Iliopoulos et al. [29]. Tit-for-Tat, is another well knowns
strategy where a player would only cooperate if the opponent
cooperated in the previous interaction. This is signified by the
probability distribution (1,1,0,0).
3) Zero-Determinant strategies: Zero-determinant strate-
gies [21], [30] are a special sub-class of memory-one strategies
that have recently gained much attention in the literature and
media. ZD strategies denote a class of memory-one strategies
that enable a player to unilaterally set the opponent’s payoff.
Due to this inherent property, ZD strategies have the ability
to gain a higher expected payoff against an opposing strategy.
However, for a strategy to be evolutionarily stable, it has to
be stable against itself as well as the opponent strategies.
It has been shown that ZD strategies do not perform well
against itself. Due to this reason, ZD strategies have been
demonstrated to be evolutionarily unstable [18], particularly
against the Pavlov strategy.
ZD strategies are defined using a set of conditional prob-
ability equations [21]. Suppose p1, p2, p3 and p4 denote the
set of probabilities that a player would cooperate given that
the player’s last interaction with the same opponent resulted
in the outcomes CC (p1), CD (p2), DC (p3) or DD (p4). ZD
strategies are defined by fixing p2 and p3 to be functions of
p1 and p4, denoted by Eq. 2 and Eq. 3.
p2 =
p1(T − P )− (1 + p4)(T −R)
R− P
(2)
p3 =
(1 − p1)(P − S) + p4(R− S)
R− P
(3)
It was shown by Press and Dyson [21] that when playing
against the ZD strategy, the expected utility of an opponent
O can be defined using the probabilities p1 and p4, while p2
and p3 are defined as functions of p1 and p4. Eq. 4 gives the
expected payoff of the opponent against the ZD strategy.
E(O,ZD) =
(1− p1)P + p4R)
(1 − p1 + p4)
(4)
Here, P and R represent the payoffs earned when both
players defect and corporate, respectively.
Hence, ZD strategies allow a player to unilaterally set
the opponent’s payoff, effectively making them extortionate
strategies. In the simulations performed here, we set the
probabilities p1 and p4 as 0.99 and 0.01 respectively, as in the
study done by Adami and Hintze [18]. We then derive p2 and
p3 to be 0.97 and 0.02, using the ZD conditional probability
equations Eq. 2 and Eq. 3.
C. Evolutionary processes
We make use of two evolutionary processes in the evolution
of populations. The first one is a well-known evolutionary pro-
cess known as the death-birth Moran process. The second one
is the stochastic strategy adoption process that was adopted
from the work of Santos et al. [23].
1) Death-birth Moran Process [22]: As the name suggests,
in the death-birth Moran process, a node is randomly selected
for removal at each time-step. Then, its replacement node is
selected from its neighbours based on a probability propor-
tional to the fitness of the neighbours. In the case of the
iterated prisoner’s dilemma game, the fitness is equivalent to
the accumulated payoff of each node, averaged over its number
of neighbours. Then, the selected neighbour is replicated to
replace the node that is being removed. The new node would
have zero payoff yet it would still have the same neighbours
as the previous node that existed in the same topological
space. This process is continued over n number of time-
steps to evolve the entire population over time. Death-birth
Moran process is commonly used to emulate the evolution of
biological species where the strategies are ‘hard-wired’ into
the players. If the lifetime of a player is significantly less
than the time-span of evolution, as with the case of biological
evolution, death-birth Moran process may effectively be used
to simulate the evolution of strategies(players) over time.
2) Stochastic strategy adoption process: Since Moran pro-
cess maybe be more applicable in the biological context where
the players with hard-wired strategies get replaced, it does
not take into account the individual payoff differences of the
node being replaced and the replicating node. Thus, it maybe
possible that the node being replaced would actually have a
higher cumulative payoff (fitness) than the replicating node.
On the other hand, in the social context, the time-span of
evolution of strategies could be considerably less than the
lifetime of a player. Hence, players would be more inclined to
adopt the apparently successful strategy and survive without
getting replaced from the population. In order to model this
kind of social evolution, a stochastic strategy adoption process
can be applied. Such a process has been used in Santos
et al. [23] to demonstrate the evolution of cooperation in
IPD games with pure strategies. We extend that method for
mixed strategies in this work. When employing this particular
strategy adoption process, a node going through evolution is
not directly replaced. Instead, its strategy could be updated by
comparing its cumulative payoff with that of a stochastically
selected neighbour. As with the Moran process, in each time-
step, a node is marked for update. Then, a potential node
to compare it with is selected from its neighbours, based on
a probability proportional to the fitness (accumulated payoff)
of the neighbours. Then, the probability of the marked node
adopting the strategy of its selected neighbour is calculated
using the following equation.
p = max{0, (Py − Px)/[k> (E (ZD,Pav)− E (Pav, ZD)]}
(5)
Where,
p - Probability that node X would adopt Y’s strategy
Px - Cumulative pay off of node X
Py - Cumulative pay off of node Y
k> - Maximum degree of X’s degree (kx) and Y’s degree (ky)
E (ZD,Pav)− The expected payoff of a ZD node against
a Pavlov node
E (Pav, ZD)– The expected payoff of a Pavlov node against
a ZD node
As shown above, the population update probability depends
on the payoff difference of the marked node and the selected
neighbour node. Also, the degree of those two nodes are
used to normalise the effect of degree differences. Still, the
cumulative payoff of the node with the higher degree would
be higher due to the fact that it would have more interactions
with other players. Thus, this equation implicitly captures the
network topology in calculating the adoption probability. Due
to this reason, this particular strategy adoption process can
be used to study the topological effect on the evolutionary
stability of strategies.
D. Complex Networks
Complex Networks are self-organising networks that show
non-trivial topological features [7]. Complex Network analysis
provides a network perspective in analysing complex systems.
Different classes of complex networks have been defined
to model real-world complex systems such as social and
biological systems. In this work, we mainly focus on two such
network classes known as well-mixed networks and scale-free
networks that are widely discussed in the network analysis
literature.
1) Well-mixed Networks: Well-mixed networks has been
one of the most widely used network models in network analy-
sis since the inception of complex network science. Also, they
are widely used in modelling evolutionary games [29]. These
networks are modelled, assuming that each node is connected
to every other node in the network. Due to this reason, well-
mixed networks can be regarded as a class of homogeneous
networks. Therefore, it is possible to approximate well-mixed
networks to lattice networks with each node having the iden-
tical number of neighbours. However, most of the real-world
networks such as social networks and biological networks do
not demonstrate well-mixed behaviour, instead being spatially
distributed with non-homogeneous topological features [7].
Still, well-mixed networks provide a good reference model
to compare with the non-homogeneous networks [16].
2) Scale-free Networks: Scale-free networks demonstrate a
network topology that shows a power-law degree distribution
[6]. In other words, the degree distribution of the network
would fit in a equation of the form y = αx−γ . Here, γ is called
the scale-free exponent. The scale-free exponent is obtained by
fitting a particular degree distribution into a power-law curve.
As the scale-free exponent increases, so does the power-law
nature of the degree distribution. Also, if the correlation of the
fitting is higher, such a degree distribution would indicate that
the respective network closely resembles a scale-free network.
Scale-free nature is abundant in real-world networks, such
as in social, biological and collaboration networks [7]. Scale-
free networks make perfect candidates to study the topological
effect of a population of players due to this reason. For exam-
ple, it has been shown that cooperation becomes the dominant
strategy in a scale-free topology due to the heterogeneity of
the network [16], [23]. Moreover, scale-free networks can
be conveniently generated using the Preferential attachment
growth model proposed by Barabasi and Albert [7]. Prefer-
ential attachment model suggests that when a network grows
in size, nodes with higher degree have a higher probability of
attracting new nodes. In other words, there exists a degree-
dependent ‘preference’ in creating links with the existing
nodes, when a new node joins the network. In this work,
we use scale-free networks generated using the preferential
attachment model for all our simulations.
3) Network Assortativity: Assortativity is the tendency ob-
served in networks where nodes mostly connect with similar
nodes. Typically, this similarity is interpreted in terms of the
degrees of nodes. Assortativity has been formally defined as
a correlation function of excess degree distributions and link
distribution of a network [10], [13]. The formal definition of
Assortativity makes use of network topological concepts such
as degree distribution p(k) and excess degree distribution q(k)
for undirected networks [13]. Given q(k), one can introduce
the quantity ej,k as the joint probability distribution of the
remaining degrees of the two nodes at either end of a randomly
chosen link. Given these distributions, the assortativity of an
undirected network is defined as:
ρ =
1
σ2q

∑
jk
jk (ej,k − qjqk)

 (6)
where σq is the standard deviation of q(k). In this work, we
use networks with varying assortativity values to observe how
the heterogeneity of mixing patterns affect the evolutionary
stability of strategies.
III. METHODOLOGY
Initially, we re-created the experimental results obtained in
the work by Adami and Hintze [18], by mixing the Zero-
determinant strategy with the Pavlov strategy in a well-mixed
population. This further enabled us to confirm the theoreti-
cal results presented in the same work using the replicator
dynamics model, suggesting that the ZD strategy would be
evolutionarily unstable against the Pavlov strategy. To do
this, we started with a population of 1000 nodes that are
connected via a lattice where each node is connected to 8 other
random nodes. Initially, the two strategies were distributed in a
random manner so that the ZD strategy would occupy different
fractions of the population (0.6 and 0.4) in each simulation run.
Then, using the death-birth Moran process, the population was
updated over 150,000 time-steps to observe the evolution of
the strategies.
Afterwards, we changed the evolutionary process to the
stochastic strategy adoption process used by Santos et al. [23].
This enabled us to determine, whether it is the population
update process or the network topology that affects the evo-
lutionary stability of the strategies in concern.
Then we replaced the well-mixed population with a non-
homogeneous scale-free network with 1000 nodes. As with
the case of the previous experiment, the ZD strategy and the
Pavlov strategy were assigned randomly among the nodes.
With the players spatially distributed in a scale-free network,
both the death-birth Moran process and the strategy adoption
process were applied separately to observe the effect that they
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Fig. 2: The evolution of ZD population fraction against the Pavlov strategy, in well-mixed and scale-free populations. The
population is allowed to evolve under the death-birth Moran process with 0.1% replacement rate. The strategies are initially
distributed randomly, with the fraction of ZD nodes being 0.4 and 0.6, respectively.
have on the evolution of strategies. The Fig. 3 depicts the
degree distribution of the scale-free network used. As the
figure shows, the degree distribution shows a power-law curve
that is reminiscent with the typical scale-free networks.
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Fig. 3: The degree distribution of the scale-free network used.
Next, we changed the initial distribution of the strategies in
such a manner that the ZD strategy would occupy the majority
of hubs. This was done by sorting the nodes according to their
degree and assigning the top 60% of the nodes with the ZD
strategy. In this configuration, the initial average degree of
ZD nodes was measured to be 3.4 while the average degree
of Pavlov nodes was 1.8. The evolution of strategies was
observed under the death-birth Moran process as well as the
strategy adoption process. The experiment was repeated with
the Pavlov strategy occupying the majority of hubs.
As the next step, we mixed the Pavlov strategy with the
general cooperator strategy and the cooperator strategy in sep-
arate scale-free networks of players. We tested the evolution of
strategies with a random initial distribution of strategies and
a strategy distribution where the opponent strategy (GC or
cooperator) is initially assigned mostly on hubs. This enabled
us to determine whether any observed topological stability of
ZD strategy is a unique and inherent property of the stratety
itself or whether it is a more general behaviour that could
occur with other strategies as well.
Finally, we observed the evolution of the Pavlov and ZD
strategies in non-homogeneous networks while the network
heterogeneity was gradually varying. To perform this test,
we generated a set of scale-free networks with varying
assortativity values by rewiring a scale-free network in a
probabilistic manner. Then, both strategies were distributed
randomly in each scale-free population in such a manner that
the ZD strategy would occupy 60% of the nodes. Afterwards,
the populations were allowed to evolve over 150,000 time-
steps under the strategy adoption process and the remaining
population fractions of ZD players were recorded. The results
were averaged over 40 independent runs.
IV. RESULTS
In certain figures in this section, we have limited the number
of time-steps shown, when the strategy in concern becomes
extinct reasonably quickly. Fig.2 shows the evolution of the
fraction of ZD nodes when the ZD strategy is mixed with the
Pavlov strategy in well-mixed and scale-free populations. The
evolutionary process used is the death-birth Moran process.
As expected, ZD strategy gradually becomes extinct in a
well-mixed population. This confirms that in a homogeneous
network, ZD strategy is evolutionarily unstable against the
Pavlov strategy that operates as a strong evolutionarily stable
strategy, as suggested by Adami and Hintze [18]. Moreover,
ZD does not survive even in a non-homogeneous population
distributed in a scale-free network, when the same evolutionary
process is applied.
Next, Fig.4 depicts the evolution of the ZD and Pavlov
strategies in a scale-free non-homogeneous network of players,
under different initial configurations. The figure shows the
evolution of the ZD fraction when the strategies are initially
distributed randomly as well as when more hubs are assigned
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Fig. 6: The evolution of ZD population fraction against the Pavlov strategy, in scale-free populations of varying initial
configurations. The population is allowed to evolve under the strategy adoption process. (a) ZD and Pavlov strategies initially
distributed randomly (b) Majority of hubs are either assigned with ZD or Pavlov (the initial average degrees of hub and non-hub
strategies are 3.4 and 1.8, respectively).
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Fig. 7: The evolution of GC and cooperator strategies competing against the Pavlov strategy, in scale-free populations of varying
initial configurations. The population is allowed to evolve under the strategy adoption process. In the two initial configurations,
the competing strategy is either assigned randomly or assigned more on hubs (in hubs initialisation, the initial average degrees
of competing nodes and Pavlov nodes are 3.4 and 1.8, respectively).
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(a) Defector − vs− Pavlov
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Fig. 8: The evolution of Defector and Tit-for-tat strategies competing against the Pavlov strategy, in scale-free populations
of varying initial configurations. The population is allowed to evolve under the strategy adoption process. In the two initial
configurations, the competing strategy is either assigned randomly or assigned more on hubs (in hubs initialisation, the initial
average degrees of competing nodes and Pavlov nodes are 3.4 and 1.8, respectively).
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Fig. 4: The evolution of ZD population fraction against the
Pavlov strategy, in scale-free populations of varying initial
configurations. The population is allowed to evolve under the
death-birth Moran process with 0.1% replacement rate. In
the two initial configurations, ZD strategy is either assigned
randomly or assigned more on hubs (in hubs initialisation, the
initial average degrees of ZD and Pavlov nodes are 3.4 and
1.8, respectively).
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Fig. 5: The evolution of ZD population fraction against the
Pavlov strategy, in a well-mixed population. The population
is allowed to evolve under the strategy adoption process. The
strategies are initially distributed randomly, with the fraction
of ZD nodes being 0.4 and 0.6, respectively.
with the ZD strategy initially. As the figure depicts, Pavlov
clearly dominates and eradicates the ZD strategy, suggesting
that irrespective of the initial distribution of strategies, ZD
cannot survive when the population is allowed to evolve under
the death-birth Moran process.
Fig.5 depicts the scenario where a well-mixed population
of ZD and Pavlov strategies are allowed to interact with each
other over time, according to the strategy adoption process
instead of the Moran process. Here too, ZD is gradually
eradicated from the population. However, when the same
evolutionary process is applied in a scale-free population of
players, ZD strategy manages to survive, as shown in Fig6[a].
According to the figure, Pavlov strategy shows weak evolution-
ary stability, failing to eradicate the ZD strategy completely,
when the two strategies are initially assigned randomly. On the
other hand, when the ZD is initially assigned to the majority
of hubs as depicted in Fig.6[b], ZD manages to become the
weak evolutionarily stable strategy over the Pavlov strategy,
becoming the dominant strategy in the network. However, as
the same figure shows, when the Pavlov strategy is initially
assigned to the majority of hubs, it behaves as a strong
evolutionarily stable strategy, wiping out the ZD population.
This suggests that under the strategy adoption evolutionary
process, the evolutionarily unstable ZD strategy may not only
survive, but may even become the more prominent strategy in
a non-homogeneous population of players.
Then, we mixed the Pavlov strategy with the GC and the
cooperator strategies respectively, in a Scale-free population.
Fig.7 and Fig. 8 show the evolution of the GC, cooperator, de-
fector and Tit-for-Tat strategy fractions over time, when those
strategies are initially placed randomly or mostly on hubs. As
the figures depict, the opposing strategies too may survive or
dominate the population based on the initial distribution of the
strategies, when the population is updated using the strategy
adoption evolutionary process. This suggests that topological
influence on the evolutionary stability is not limited to the ZD
strategy, but may apply to other strategies as well.
Finally, we tested the evolution of the ZD population
against the Pavlov strategy while the heterogeneity of the
networks are gradually changed. Fig.9 shows the variation of
the remaining ZD fraction after 150,000 time-steps under the
strategy adoption process. As the figure shows, there exits a
negative correlation between the network assortativity and the
remaining ZD fraction. The actual Pearson correlation value of
the two series is -0.85, suggesting a strong negative correlation.
Network assortativity is a measure of the similarity or the
homogeneity of the mixing patterns of the nodes. Therefore,
this result suggests that the effect of network topology on the
evolutionary stability of a strategy increases, as the network
becomes more heterogeneous.
V. DISCUSSION
Network game theory has gained prominence as an inter-
disciplinary field. Complex networks are increasingly used to
model social systems, while the cognitive decision making
processes of individuals in such systems is modelled by game
theory. It is obvious that the topological connection patterns
would influence the decisions made by individual entities, and
many questions remain answered in regards to how topology
can influence the strategies individual players will choose over
time.
In this work, we attempted to evaluate how the network
topology of a population of players affect the evolutionary
stability of a strategy. In particular, we focused on a class
of strategies known as Zero-determinant strategies, which has
been demonstrated to be evolutionarily unstable against the
Pavlov strategy.
Based on the results gathered from this research, we suggest
that network topology has an effect on whether a particular
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
-0.5 -0.3 -0.1  0.1  0.3  0.5  0.7  0.9
R
em
ai
ni
ng
 Z
D 
fra
ct
io
n
Assortativity
Fig. 9: The evolution of ZD population fraction against the
Pavlov strategy, in scale-free populations with varying network
assortativity values. The population is allowed to evolve under
the strategy adoption process. The results are averaged over
40 independent runs.
strategy is evolutionarily stable or not. However, the topolog-
ically influenced evolutionary stability is a weak evolutionary
stability and not a strong evolutionary stability. In other words,
the stable strategy would not be able to completely eradicate
the competing strategy and the competing strategy would be
able to survive within the confines of the network.
We also identified that the topological effect of evolutionary
stability is determined by the evolutionary process used. When
using the death-birth Moran process to evolve the population,
topology does not seem have a significant effect on the
evolutionary stability of strategies. However, when the strategy
adoption process suggested by Santos et al. [23] is applied,
topology does have significant effect on evolutionary stability
of a strategy within a population. Strategy adoption process
takes into account the cumulative payoff of each node in
determining whether a strategy should be replaced or not.
Therefore, this result suggests that an evolutionarily unstable
strategy could survive when they occupy the hubs surrounded
by leaf nodes assigned with the evolutionarily stable strategy.
In a heterogeneous network of players, hubs tend to have more
strategic interactions with their opponents compared to leaf
nodes. Thus, a hub with an evolutionarily unstable strategy
would continue to be irreplaceable by the neighbouring nodes’
strategies, as it would continue to have a higher payoff
compared to its immediate neighbours.
The significance of the evolutionary process may have
implications in the real-world networks of strategic players.
Moran process would be more appropriate in the biological
context where the lifetime of a player is significantly less
than the evolutionary time-span. It could be effectively used to
model the evolution of species where the strategies are ‘hard-
wired’ to the players and the evolution happens through the
replacement of players with the replicas of better performing
players. However, in the social context, the evolution of strate-
gies may be driven by the adoption of strategies by the players
based on the performance of their neighbouring players. In
other words, a stochastic strategy adoption process could be
used to model the evolution of strategies when the lifetime
of a player maybe considerably larger than the time-span of
evolution. Examples of such situations involve the interactions
that happen in corporate sector and financial markets. There,
it is often observable that the players continually adopt the
strategies of other players, in their struggle to survive. Thus,
the strategy adoption evolutionary update process may be more
relevant when the evolution of strategies is applied in the social
context. Accordingly, topological effect on the evolutionary
stability of strategies may be more prevalent in the social
context, compared to the biological context.
Further, it is important to note that not only the topology,
but also the initial distribution of the strategies within the
network too plays a significant role in shaping the evolution of
the strategies. For instance, when the evolutionarily unstable
strategy occupies hubs as opposed to the leaf nodes at the
initiation of the evolution, it even manages to become the more
prominent strategy within the network over time, resembling
a weak evolutionarily stable strategy.
Even though we mainly focused on the ZD and Pavlov
strategies in this work, we could replicate similar observations
with other well-known strategies such as the general cooper-
ator and cooperator strategies, competing against the Pavlov
strategy. This could mean that the variation of evolutionary
stability due to topological stability of strategies is a more
general phenomena that may be applicable to most strategies
that are competing with each other. In addition, the topological
effect on the evolutionary stability may be observed for other
games other than the Prisoner’s dilemma game. For instance, it
would be interesting to observe how the extensive form games,
where the temporal dimension is built-in to the strategic
decisions, are affected by the topological placement of the
players. Such studies may be useful in accurately predicting
the evolutionary stability of strategies in scenarios such as
auctions, which can be modelled with extensive form games.
In conclusion, we could identify the following three factors
that determine the topological stability of strategies in a
non-homogeneous network. Network topology, evolutionary
process and the initial distribution of the strategies. By varying
these three factors, an evolutionarily unstable strategy may be
able to survive and may even operate as a weak evolutionarily
stable strategy, in a population of players connected in a
non-homogeneous topology. Based on our observations, the
topological stability of strategies may be more prevalent in
the social context of the evolution of strategies, in comparison
to the biological context.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank Michael Harre` of the Centre
for Complex Systems Research at the University of Sydney
and Chistoph Adami and Arend Hintze of Michigan State
University for their valuable comments and suggestions.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, “Game theory and economic
behavior,” 1944.
[2] E. Rasmusen and B. Blackwell, Games and information. Cambridge,
1994, vol. 2.
[3] J. M. Smith and G. Price, “lhe logic of animal conflict,” Nature, vol.
246, p. 15, 1973.
[4] J. M. Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games. Springer, 1993.
[5] J. Bendor and P. Swistak, “Types of evolutionary stability and the
problem of cooperation.” Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, vol. 92, no. 8, pp. 3596–3600, 1995.
[6] A.-L. Baraba´si and R. Albert, “Emergence of scaling in random net-
works,” science, vol. 286, no. 5439, pp. 509–512, 1999.
[7] R. Albert and A.-L. Baraba´si, “Statistical mechanics of complex net-
works,” Reviews of Modern Physics, vol. 74, pp. 47–97, 2002.
[8] G. Thedchanamoorthy, M. Piraveenan, S. Uddin, and U. Senanayake,
“Influence of vaccination strategies and topology on the herd immunity
of complex networks,” Social Network Analysis and Mining, vol. 4,
no. 1, pp. 1–16, 2014.
[9] M. Prokopenko, M. Piraveenan, and P. Wang, “On convergence of dy-
namic cluster formation in multi-agent networks,” Advances in Artificial
Life, pp. 884–894, 2005.
[10] M. E. J. Newman, “Mixing patterns in networks,” Physical Review E,
vol. 67, no. 2, p. 026126, 2003.
[11] M. Piraveenan, M. Prokopenko, and A. Y. Zomaya, “Local assorta-
tiveness in scale-free networks,” Europhysics Letters, vol. 84, no. 2,
p. 28002, 2008.
[12] ——, “Assortative mixing in directed biological networks,” IEEE/ACM
Transactions on computational biology and bioinformatics, vol. 9(1),
pp. 66–78, 2012.
[13] R. V. Sole´ and S. Valverde, “Information theory of complex networks: on
evolution and architectural constraints,” in Complex Networks, ser. Lec-
ture Notes in Physics, E. Ben-Naim, H. Frauenfelder, and Z. Toroczkai,
Eds. Springer, 2004, vol. 650.
[14] M. Piraveenan, D. Polani, and M. Prokopenko, “Emergence of genetic
coding: an information-theoretic model,” in Advances in Artificial Life.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007, pp. 42–52.
[15] M. Piraveenan, M. Prokopenko, and L. Hossain, “Percolation central-
ity: Quantifying graph-theoretic impact of nodes during percolation in
networks,” PloS one, vol. 8, no. 1, p. e53095, 2013.
[16] F. C. Santos and J. M. Pacheco, “Scale-free networks provide a unifying
framework for the emergence of cooperation,” Physical Review Letters,
vol. 95, no. 9, p. 098104, 2005.
[17] D. B. Fogel, “Evolving behaviors in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma,”
Evolutionary Computation, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 77–97, 1993.
[18] C. Adami and A. Hintze, “Evolutionary instability of zero-determinant
strategies demonstrates that winning is not everything,” Nature commu-
nications, vol. 4, 2013.
[19] D. Kasthurirathna, M. Piraveenan, and M. Harre, “Influence of topology
in the evolution of coordination in complex networks under information
diffusion constraints,” The European Physical Journal B, vol. 87, no. 1,
pp. 1–15, 2014.
[20] D. Kasthurirathna, H. Nguyen, M. Piraveenan, S. Uddin, and
U. Senanayake, “Optimisation of strategy placements for public good
in complex networks,” in Social Computing (SocialCom), 2014 Interna-
tional Conference on. IEEE, 2014, p. in print.
[21] W. H. Press and F. J. Dyson, “Iterated prisoners dilemma contains
strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent,” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, vol. 109, no. 26, pp. 10 409–10 413,
2012.
[22] P. A. P. Moran et al., “The statistical processes of evolutionary theory.”
The statistical processes of evolutionary theory., 1962.
[23] F. Santos, J. Rodrigues, and J. Pacheco, “Graph topology plays a
determinant role in the evolution of cooperation,” Proceedings of the
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, vol. 273, no. 1582, pp. 51–55,
2006.
[24] J. F. Nash et al., “Equilibrium points in n-person games,” Proceedings
of the national academy of sciences, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 48–49, 1950.
[25] J. Maynard Smith, “The theory of games and the evolution of animal
conflicts,” Journal of theoretical biology, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 209–221,
1974.
[26] S. Le and R. Boyd, “Evolutionary dynamics of the continuous iterated
prisoner’s dilemma,” Journal of theoretical biology, vol. 245, no. 2, pp.
258–267, 2007.
[27] A. Rapoport, Prisoner’s dilemma: A study in conflict and cooperation.
University of Michigan Press, 1965, vol. 165.
[28] D. P. Kraines and V. Y. Kraines, “Natural selection of memory-one
strategies for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma,” Journal of Theoretical
Biology, vol. 203, no. 4, pp. 335–355, 2000.
[29] D. Iliopoulos, A. Hintze, and C. Adami, “Critical dynamics in the
evolution of stochastic strategies for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma,”
PLoS computational biology, vol. 6, no. 10, p. e1000948, 2010.
[30] A. J. Stewart and J. B. Plotkin, “Extortion and cooperation in the
prisoners dilemma,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
vol. 109, no. 26, pp. 10 134–10 135, 2012.
